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SYMPOSIUM: INDIANA DECISIONS, 1927-28
PAUL L. SAYRE.
The Student Board of Editors voted not to publish the usual
Recent Case Notes in this issue of the JOURNAL. It decided in-
stead to print a brief symposium of the comments that have ap-
peared during the past year in other legal periodicals of the
country in which Indiana cases have been considered and crit-
ically analyzed.' The Student Editors felt it would be best to
set forth only what other legal periodicals have said about In-
diana decisions, with footnote references to cases that have also
been discussed in our JOURNAL. The writer has had the privi-
lege of association with the Student Editors in the editorial
work of the JOURNAL. They requested him to present this sym-
posium on their behalf. In trying. to carry out this plan it must
be understood that he attempts to do no more than to present
the opinions of others without any discussion of his own, and
with the consciousness that only a reading of the comments
themselves will give a full understanding of the position which
Indiana cases have held during the past year as indicated by
professional comments in these periodicals of national standing.
In going over legal publications in America for the year 1927-
28, it appears that there have been twenty-four critical com-
ments upon Indiana cases decided during this year. Roughly
speaking, it seems fair to say that the decisions in New York
have been more frequently the subject of comment in legal
periodicals than Indiana decisions. On the other hand, it may
be said that Indiana cases have been discussed about as much as
cases arising in the other states. The comments here consid-
ered indicate that Indiana decisions have been as often praised
as the decisions in other states, while adverse criticism has been
about as frequent in our case as in the case of others. In sub-
1 This paper deals only with Indiana cases decided by the Supreme or
Appellate courts during the year 1927-28, in so far as these decisions in
turn have been the subject of comments in legal periodicals during the
same period. More accurately it should be said that both the Indiana
decisions and the comments discussing them begin with January 1, 1927,
and continue until June 1, 1928. The legal periodicals for the month of
June, 1928, were not available at the time this paper was written; hence
comments dealing with Indiana cases that may appear in the issues for
June, 1928, are not considered here.
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mitring a symposium of these comments, it is difficult to fix upon
an order of presentation which will be helpful to the reader.
The cases do not group themselves conveniently under any of the
usual legal classifications as to subject matter, and a presenta-
tion according to the date when the case was decided, or the
periodical in which the criticism appeared would not be helpful.
The writer ventures, therefore, to list them in alphabetical or-
der according to the names of the decided cases, so that refer-
ence to the several cases will thus be facilitated and the com-
ments in all periodicals that discussed a particular case will ap-
pear together.
BEARSS v. CORBETT
The case of Bearss v. Corbett has been commented upon in
the Harvard,2 Minnesota,3 and Pennsylvania4 Law Reviews. In
this case one Pierce provided by deed that certain land should
go to his wife for life, then to his daughter for life, then to
the children of the latter. Before the birth of the plaintiff, her
mother, the second life tenant, brought an action to quiet her
title to the land. She joined as defendant the plaintiff's half-
brother who, being six years old, was represented by a guardian
ad litem. The court decreed that the plaintiff's mother owned
the land in fee simple. By mesne conveyances the land passed
from her to the defendants. The plaintiff, alleging that she
was not bound by the former decree, which was admittedly er-
roneous, brought an action to quiet her title to the land. From
a judgment sustaining the demurrers of the defendants, the
plaintiff appealed. Held, that the plaintiff is bound by the for-
mer decree under the rule of virtual representation.5
The Harvard Law Review Comment and the Minnesota Law
Review comment approved the result of the case and the reason-
ing presented by the court in its opinion on the ground that the
doctrine of virtual representation is well established in the law
and that it applies for the purpose of terminating a contingent
remainder where the contingent remainder thus determined is
represented by a like interest in the litigation itself.6 It is
2 41 Harv. L. Rev. 543. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind. L.
Jour. 400.
3 12 Minn. Law Rev. 664.
4 76 Pa. L. Rev. 462.
5 Bearss v. Corbett, 158 N. E. 299 (Ind. App. 1927). Comments that
are here discussed on this case appeared in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 543.
6 Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068 (1909); Buchan v.
German-American Land Co., 180 Ia. 911, 164 N. W. 119 (1917).
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pointed out that the rule is alleviated at least under the Torrens
System, which provides a fund to compensate those who are
injured by the doctrine of virtual representation as applied in
connection with the settling of title under the Torrens Act.7 If
it be said that this doctrine enables the court to take property
without due process of law, it is answered that the doctrine of
virtual representation applies only where the representation is
fair and where there is a real necessity for its application. 8
The theory of necessity is based upon considerations analogous
to those quieting title in equity. It is felt that property rights
must be vested to the advantage of the living and that the in-
terests of the afterborn should not preclude such final vesting
of property interests in the living where the afterborn are ade-
quately represented by those having similar if not identical in-
terests in the litigation itself. The Pennsylvania Law Review
stresses the point that the doctrine of virtual representation
should not apply in the case of cutting off contingent remainders
unless there is a real necessity for its use in the disposition of
present interests. Thus it is said that there is no objection to
the use of virtual representation where property is changed
from personalty into realty or where the purpose is to destroy
some claim adverse to the paramount title, but that it is a
different question where contingent remainders, valid under
the original conveyance, are to be cut off when the remainder-
man himself is not a party to the suit.9 The Pennsylvania com-
mentator also deplores the Bearss case on the ground that it has
extended the doctrine of virtual representation from the limited
field of cutting off contingent remainders upon the ground of
strict necessity to the more hazy ground of general convenience,
regardless of real interests of the contingent remainderman
himself.10 The case of Bearss v. Corbett is difficult to determine
on the facts since the former decree of the court vesting the fee
simple title in the plaintiff was admittedly erroneous. There
was no appeal from that decree and it was binding on all par-
7 Drake v. Frazer, 105 Neb. 162, 179 N. W. 393 (1920).
8 Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 329, 49 N. E. 652, 653 (1898).
9 "However, in a case like Bearss v. Corbett, where the doctrine is
applied to cut off the rights of the contingent remainderman, rather than
to change them into another form, and to enlarge the estate of the life
tenant into a fee simple, it would seem that the reason of the rule has been
overlooked." 76 Pa. L. Rev. 463.
10 Johnson v. Jacob, 74 Ky. 646 (1876). Contra: Hopkins v. Patton,
257 Ill 346, 100 N. E. 992 (1913). But see Downey v. Seib, 185 N. Y. 427,
78 N. E. 66 (1906).
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ties involved unless it could be attacked collaterally. Thus it
was a hard case for the application of the rule of virtual rep-
resentation, inasmuch as admittedly there had been an errone-
ous decision in the suit in which the virtual representation was
held to be binding.
DURHAM v. STATE
In Durham v. State, the defendant, a deputy game warden,
arrested B for committing a misdemeanor in violating the fish
and game law. B resisted arrest and, while attempting to es-
cape in a boat, struck the defendant with an oar, whereupon the
defendant shot and wounded him. The defendant was tried and
convicted of assault and battery. The trial court instructed the
jury that the defendant would not be authorized to use such
force and instrumentalities as would imperil the life of B, in
order to overcome his resistance. On appeal it was held, that
the trial court erred in omitting to instruct the jury that the
defendant was not obliged to retreat when forcibly resisted,
but might use reasonable force to effect the arrest, and if threat-
ened with death or serious injury he would be justified in
wounding or taking the life of the misdemeanant, in self-
defense. 1
The Minnesota Law Review 12 points out that it is generally
held that an officer in making a lawful arrest of a misdemeanant
may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the
arrest. The commentator states that the Indiana decision in the
Durham case is in keeping with the majority rule which holds
that an officer in making a lawful arrest of a misdemeanant may
use such force as is reasonably necessary to overcome any for-
cible resistence made by the misdemeanant, even to the extent
of taking his life.' 3 The minority rule on this subject limits
the right of an officer to use such force, extending to the taking
of life, to situations where the officer is put in reasonable ap-
prehension of immediate death or great bodily harm by the na-
ture of misdemeanant's resistence.' 4 But it has been held fur-
ther that even under the latter rule the officer has no duty to
retreat in order to avoid such a situation.15 Thus the Minne-
11 Durham v. State, 159 N. E. 145 (Ind., 1927).
12 12 Minn. L. Rev. 539. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind.
L. Jour. 242.
13 Commonwealth v. Marcum, 135 Ky. 1, 122 S. W. 515 (1909); Kreuger
v. State, 171 Wise. 566, 177 N. W. 917 (1920).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sota commentator approves the result of the Durham case since
he finds there is no significant difference between the majority
and minority rules in their application. "Where the reasonable
force rule is applied, the taking of a misdemeanant's life will
ordinarily be found to be reasonable only where the officer was
in reasonable apprehension of immediate death or great bodily
injury, so it may be said that in effect both rules are substan-
tially the same."'16
FAIR BLDG. CO. v. WINEMAN REALTY CO.
In the case of Fair Bldg. Co. v. Wineman Realty Co., A and
B were adjoining land-owners. A covenanted for himself and
-assigns to pay one-half the value of a party wall to be erected
by B whenever the wall should be utilized by A or his successors.
A assigned the reversion to the defendant in error and the term
to the plaintiff in error. The wall was used and in an action by
the reversioner against the tenant to be saved harmless in
accordance with a covenant in the lease, judgment was entered
in favor of the reversioner. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed since the party wall agreement was a covenant run-
ning with the land, cross-easements of support having been
createdY"
The Yale Law Journal's commentator in discussing this case
states briefly that there are three theories with respect to the
enforcibility of promises to pay for a proportionate part of a
party wall where the promissor is not asked to make the pay-
ment himself, but the payment is demanded of a subsequent
alienee. One view, which is adopted in the instant case, is that
immediately upon the building of the wall, each party owns
that portion situated on his land and the covenant operates
to convey cross-easements of support, commonly called recip-
rocal easements. 19 This theory supplies the "privity of estate"
which can be used to bind a later alienee. It is considered that
the promise to pay restricts the original non-builder's privi-
14 Thomws v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 18 S. W. 854, 15 L. R. A. 558, 29
Am. St. Rep. 68 (1892).
15 State v. Smith, 127 Ia. 534, 103 N. W. 944, 70 L. R. A. 264, 4 Ann.
Cas. 758 and note (1894).
16 12 Minn. L. Rev. 540.
17Fair Bldg. Co. v. Wineman Realty Co., 156 N. E. 433 (Ind., 1927).
18 37 Yale L. Jour. 126.
19 Kim. v. Griwn, 67 Minn. 25, 69 N. W. 634 (1896); Jones, Easements
(1898), sec. 632; Sims, Covenants (1901), 198 et seq.
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lege of user and thereby affects his legal relations with respect
to the land. Hence it is said under this theory that the burden
"touches and concerns" the land. So it may be said also that
the benefit runs, since the builder's right to reimbursement ma-
tures only upon his later sustaining the additional burden of sup-
port caused by the non-builder's utilization of the party wall for
his own building. Some courts, however, refuse to give the
cross-easement this effect and, therefore, hold that only a debtor-
creditor relationship exists; consequently both the benefit and
the burden are "personal and do not run. ' 20 The same result
as that reached by the Indiana court in the instant case is
reached in perhaps a majority of American jurisdictions under
a different theory. These states hold that a builder owns the
entire wall, having been granted an easement of support by the
nonbuilder, the latter having a power to acquire ownership of
the half of his land.21 Both the benefit and burden would clearly
run under such a theory. The Yale commentator suggests that
the only serious objection to either the first or the third theory
is that they might be subject to the rule against perpetuities.
He concludes that American courts that follow either theory are
right in holding that it is not subject to the rule against per-
petuities. 22 It must be conceded generally, that the rule against
perpetuities should not be applied in any case unless there is a
strong reason in public policy for its use. Thus the rule against
perpetuities is rightly considered not to apply to covenants run-
ning with the land, just as it does not apply to rights of entry,
rights of reverter, and rights of renewal of leases, and options
to purchase in America.
FOUNTAIN PARK CO. v. HENSLER.
The Yale Law Journal 23 comments upon the case of Foun-
tain Park Co. v. Hensler, involving a difficult and important
question in the law of eminent domain. Unfortunately no law
review during the past year has commented upon the later In-
diana case of Kessler v. City of Indianapolis which involves
much the same issue and which has been the subject of consider-
20 Gibson v. Holden, 115 II. 199, 3 N. E. 282 (1885).
21 Jones v. Monroe, 285 S. W. 1055 (Tex. Com. App. 1926); Berry '.
Godfrey, 198 Mass. 228, 84 N. E. 304 (1908); Aigler, Agreements to Pay
For Party Walls (1911), 10 Mich. L. Rev. 187.
22 Gray, Rules Against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915), sees. 329, 330, 603a.
23 36 Yale L. Jour. 1180.
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able annotation in the reports. The case of Fountain Park Co.
v. Hensler involved a statute which authorized a chautauqua
corporation to condemn certain land, which it proceeded to do.
In his brief the defendant questioned the constitutionality of
this statute. The plaintiff excepted to a rule sustaining the
defendant's objection. Held on appeal that the exception be
overruled upon the ground, inter alia, that since the statute
authorized the condemnation of property for other than a pub-
lic use it was unconstitutional. 24
It is said generally, as in the instant case, that private prop-
erty cannot be condemned for a private purpose. An analysis
of the decided cases, however, makes the matter much less sim-
ple than this general statement would indicate. There are a
number of instances in which privately owned land has been
condemned for what at least appeared to be private purposes.
Thus a right-of-way was condemned to permit the development
of privately owned mines, 25 and, in another case, a similar right-
of-way was condemned to reach inaccessible privately owned
timber lands. 26 In other cases the court has allowed condemna-
tion of a right-of-way of private railway facilities for a re-
motely situated factory 27 as well as the condemnation of prop-
erty to allow the construction of irrigation ditches for the im-
provement of private lands. 28 On the other hand, a private col-
lege and a private cemetery corporation have been forbidden
similar privileges.29 A synthesis of the cases would seem to
indicate that the condemnation of land for private purposes has
been allowed only where the economic development of communi-
ties seemed to require it, under the then present conditions. The
current Indiana case in denying the right of condemnation for
24 Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 155 N. E. 465 (Ind. 1927). The case
of Kessler v. City of Indianapolis, 157 N. E. 547 (1927), is also reported and
extensively annotated in 53 A. L. R. I.
25 Strickley v. Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301 (1906);
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Mines, 53 Utah 413, 174 Pac. 172
(1918). Contra: Inspiration Copper Co. v. New Keystone Copper Co., 16
Ariz. 257, 144 Pac. 277 (1.914).
26 Mountain Timber Co. v. Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac. 994 (1914).
Contra: Anderson v. Logging Co., 71 Or. 276, 139 Pac. 736 (1914).
27 Armstrong v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 282 S. W. 382 (Tenn. 1926); Cot-
trell v. Chicago Ry., 192 Ind. 692, 138 N. E. 504 (1923). Contra: Limits
Industrial Co. v. Pipe Works, 321 Ill. 101, 151 N. E. 567 (1926).
28 Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676 (1905); Contra: Smith
v. Cameron, 106 Or. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922).
29 Connecticut College v. Calvert, RG Conn. 421, 88 Atl. 633 (1913);
Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551, 5 Atl. 353 (1886).
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private purpose seems to be in accord both with the prevailing
decisions and the theory upon which they probably rest, since
it could hardly be said that land for the use of a chatauqua cor-
poration was incidental to the necessary economic development
of the community.
LOVETT v. LOVETT.
In the case of Lovett v. Lovett the defendant had contracted
to execute a will leaving all her property to the plaintiff. She
also agreed not to revoke the will. The will was executed in ac-
cordance with the contract. Later the defendant repudiated her
agreement and threatened to revoke the will. The plaintiff
sued to enjoin her from breaking her contract and revoking
the will. Held, that the injunction should issue enjoining the
defendant from revoking the will in violation of the contract.3 0
This case is discussed in the Michigan31 and Pennsylvania3 2
Law Reviews. A contract to bequeath or devise property if it
has the requisites of a valid contract is not only enforcible in
law but is also protected in equity. Hitherto there has not been
specific enforcement of all contracts to make wills since it is
held that there is no breach of the contract until death of the
promisor.3 3 Where the promisor has not breached his contract
but has neglected to execute a will equity will not decree that he
execute a specific will. But if the promisor has made a con-
veyance in violation of his contract to make a will to one not a
bona fide purchaser for value, equity may set aside this convey-
ance, or decree that the grantee hold the property in trust sub-
ject to the provision of the contract.34 It has already been held
that if the promisor repudiates his contract and threatens to
convey in violation of its terms, equity may enjoin him from
thus conveying away the property. Under these facts the
promisor holds the property in trust for himself for life with
the remainder to the promisee in fee. The instant case in In-
diana attempts the further remedy of enjoining the promisor
from revoking his will in so far as that will is made in com-
pliance with an enforcible contract. The main objection to this
30 Lovett v. Lovett, 155 N. E. 528 and 157 N. E. 104 (Ind. 1927).
31 26 Mich. L. Jour. 464. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind.
L. Jour. 242.
32 76 Pa. Law. Rev. 110.
33 Maud v. Maud, 33 0. S. 147.
34 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N. W. 173, 1 L. R. A.
596; Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N. J. Eq. 581, 35 AtI. 750 and 56 N. J. Eq. 375,
39 AtI. 687, 40 At. 440.
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further remedy is that such revocation might occur in violation
of the injunction and that it would probably be effective in spite
of the injunction.3 5 It may be answered, however, that the in-
junction is likely to be obeyed and that it gives some further
protection to the contracting parties.
MATHEWS v. REX HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INS. CO.
This case involves an action on a life insurance policy. A
physician employed by the hospital, at which the insured had
been a patient, was permitted, over the objection of the plaintiff,
to testify to information obtained in the course of an autopsy
performed at the hospital, which was sufficient to avoid the
policy. The physician was not a member of the hospital staff
and had not treated or previously seen the patient. The ad-
missibility of this evidence is affected by the statute, Burns'
Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 550, which provides that physicians are
not competent witnesses "as to matter communicated to them,
as such, by patients, in the course of their professional business,
or advice given in such cases." Held, that under this statute the
physician was incompetent to testify as to information obtained
at the autopsy, and the admission of such testimony was re-
versible error.386
The Minnesota Law Review, 37 the Columbia Law Review5 5
and the Yale Law JournaZ39 comment upon this case. All of
them reach the conclusion that the decision is not justified on
the authorities, and that it is out of keeping with the sound de-
velopment of the law of evidence. It is pointed out that in gen-
eral any witness should be allowed to testify to any evidence of
which he has knowledge unless it is excluded under some excep-
tion that is well founded in the law and seems to be necessary
under our system of trial by court and jury, or unless it is ex-
cluded because of some privilege that, while personal to the wit-
ness, is well recognized in the authorities and is helpful in the
administration of justice.40 The privilege in this instance is
35 Huston, Enforcement of Decrease in Equity, 22, 55; 43 A. L. R. 1024.
36 Mathews v. Rex Health and Accident Ins. Co., 157 N. E. 467 (Ind.
1927).
3712 Minn. L. Rev. 242.
38 28 Col. L. Rev. 242.
39 37 Yale L. Jour. 122.
40 "At common law there is no 'privilege' of physicians. The earliest
intimation of anything of the sort appears to have been contained in a
dictum of Justice Buller, in the old English case of Wilson v. Rastalt, to
the effect that:
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given on the ground that patients in communicating with their
physicians are likely to hide important information which
would be necessary in ministering to their needs, if they think
these facts may later be revealed in court. Thus the statute
says that the physician shall not be required or permitted to
testify as to those facts involving the patient's physical condi-
tion of which he learned through his professional employment.
It seems to be agreed now that the actual justification of this
rule in causing the patient to be more free in communicating
with his physician is very doubtful. 41 It is to be remembered
that the patient rightly understands that a physician will not
divulge anything he learns in his professional capacity under
normal circumstances. Probably it is this general professional
assurance of secrecy that gives the patient confidence in telling
his physician of his physical condition. It is pointed out that
the patient rarely knows of the physician's legal obligation not
to divulge these facts in the course of a trial, and that his pro-
tection against such revelation at trial has no influence in caus-
ing the patient to trust his physician. On the other hand the
general interests of justice seem to require that this privilege
should not be granted. For instance, in the instant case, it
was clear at trial that the hospital physician who performed
the autopsy had secured evidence of the first importance in de-
termining the rights of the claimants of an insurance policy.
Unless some controlling public policy interfered, the disposition
of claimant's rights under an insurance policy or in any other
litigation should be determined in the light of all available evi-
dence. The rule of privilege here enabled the plaintiff to recover
in the insurance policy trial, although it is admitted that except
for this rule there would have been ample evidence to prevent
'There are cases to which it is much to be lamented that the law of
privilege is not extended; those in which medical persons are obliged to
disclose information which they acquire by reason of their professional
characters.'
This statement, although without effect upon the law of England, seems to
have been instrumental in bringing about a statutory provision in the
state of New York, which has been extensively adopted and followed, until
similar provisions are now in force in slightly more than half of the
states." (Footnote authorities in explanation of the above quotation are
found on the same page.) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 391.
41 "Personally, we believe that the existence of any privilege at all is
misguided sentimentality on the part of the legislatures in cases where a
party voluntarily submits some question concerning his physical condition
to a court." 5 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2189, p. 4171
at 4174.
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recovery. The commentators take the view that the instant
case is an unfortunately liberal construction of the Indiana
statute, and that it is out of keeping with the interpretation of
similar statutes in other states.42 This decision is considered to
be unfortunate since it extends the privilege to cover evidence
secured by hospital physicians under an autopsy; it is asserted
that for the privilege to cover information thus obtained could
not reasonably further the purpose behind the statute itself,
since the patient would not keep the facts from his physician,
if he knew that another physician in turn could later secure in-
formation through an autopsy.
RENFROW v. CITIZENS STATE BANK
The Michigan Law Review43 comments upon the case of Ren-
frow v. Citizens' State Bank of Stilesville. It considers that the
case involves two main points and concludes that the Indiana
court has come to a sound and wise conclusion on both points.
The case involved a defendant who promised to honor a draft on
the plaintiff's customer for the purchase price of a car load of
hogs and subsequently refused to pay due to the fact that the
hogs were not in such condition as to comply with the terms of
the contract of purchase. The court held that the defendant
was not an acceptor and that he could set up the failure of con-
sideration as a defence when sued on the plaintiff's draft.44
On a case involving similar facts the New York court held
that the guarantee bank was an acceptor but that it was not
liable because the plaintiff payee, having failed to perform prop-
erly, was not in the position of one who in the words of the
N. I. L. "receives the bill for value."4 5 This case seems doubtful
42 "Thus it has been held recently that the result of an autopsy was
not privileged because the information was not obtained for purposes of
treatment. Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 239, 210 N. W.
829 (1926); Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 54 Utah 443, 181 Pac.
448 (1919) (autopsy not privileged unless clearly only to supplement infor-
mation acquired during previous treatment). Since most cases where the
privilege is claimed are actions on insurance policies where deceased's mis-
representations as to health are involved or actions for corporal injuries
where bodily condition is involved, the medical testimony would seem most
highly probative. In such cases there would seem to be no reason for
withholding facts except to conceal fraud." 37 Yale L. Jour. 122.
43 26 Mich. L. Rev. 567.
44 Renfrow v. Citizens State Bank of Stilesville, 158 N. E. 919 (Ind.
App. 1927).
45 N. I. L., sec. 135 (in New York sec. 223). Lemon Importing Co. v.
Garfield Savings Bank, 105 Misc. 627, 173 N. Y. Supp. 551.
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since failure of consideration is generally not thought to be of
consequence as between payee and acceptor. 46 Furthermore sec-
tion 132, N. I. L., states "The acceptance of a bill is the sig-
nification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the draw-
er," and courts have held that a bill must be accepted by the
drawee unless it is an acceptance for honor.47 It is to be noted
further that in spite of its decision the New York court did not
hold that the bank was an acceptor for honor and the Indiana
court reached the same conclusion. Since the bill was drawn on
the purchaser, the defending bank could not occupy the status
of an acceptor. If the bank was liable at all, such liability must
be on a simple unilateral contract between it and the plaintiff.
It seems reasonable to interpret that contract as subject to an
implied condition that the hogs would be fit for the purpose con-
templated by the buyer and seller and consequently to absolve
the bank of liability where this implied condition was not met.
On both grounds, therefore, the instant case seems sound.48
SANCHEZ v. STATE
In this case the defendant at the trial had been prosecuted
for murder in the first degree. The defense counsel, appointed
by the state for the defendant, failed to subpoena witnesses for
the defence, did not object to much incompetent testimony, at
the trial, and permitted the use of an improper interpreter. On
appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree the court
reversed the judgment on the ground that the incompetence of
defendant's attorney justified reversal.49
Normally the courts regard the incompetence of an attorney
as imputable to the party who employs him and do not give any
relief on that ground. Under the authorities it seems clear,
however, that in extreme cases there may be relief.5o Perhaps
the paucity of cases on this point in the reports is due to the
fact that when the trial court notices that a party has incom-
46 Bulliet v. Allegheny Trust Co., 284 Pac. 561, 569, 131 At. 471 (1925).
47 May v. Kelly and Frazier, 27 Ala. 497 (1855); Heenan v. Nash, 8
Minn. 407 (Gil. 363) (1863).
48Bank v. Stapleton, 118 Kans. 755, 236 Pac. 828 (1925); National
City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 300 Il1. 103, 132 N. E. 832
(1921).
49 Sanchez v. State, 157 N. E. 1 (Ind. 1927).5o State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93 (1882). Overruled by State v. Dreber,
137 Mo. 11, 23, 38 S. W. 567, 570 (1896). Cf. People v. Blevins, 25 Ill. 381,
96 N. E. 214 (1911).
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petent counsel, especially in a criminal cause, the court will take
an adjournment and arrange between the parties for adequate
counsel. In this case the demand for relief seemed urgent since
counsel for the defendant had been appointed by the state itself
and no fault in selection could be attributed to the defendant.
The commentator in the Columbia Law Review51 takes the view
that the holding of the Indiana court is highly to be commended
since it takes a non-technical view of the relief the appellate
court may give in a case where a technical application of some
fixed rule would be unfortunate. Clearly there must be some
latitude of discretion in the appellate court under such circum-
stances. 52  The need for relief in the instant case was urgent,
because the action for damages against the incompetent attorney
was inadequate; the defendant stood condemned to death; any
relief to be effective had to go to the judgment of the trial court
itself.
SMITH v. ZABEL
The commenter in the Michigan Law Review53 disapproved
the case of Smith v. Zabel, which involved a promissory note,
otherwise negotiable, that contained the following provision:
"No extension of the time of payment, with or without our
knowledge . . . shall release us, or either of us, from
the obligation of payment." The court held that this provision
made the time of payment uncertain and thus rendered the in-
strument non-negotiable. 54
The majority of the cases have held that provisions in instru-
ments, otherwise negotiable in form, relating to extension of
time of payment do not destroy the negotiability of instru-
ments.55 The provisions in other cases, however, decided ac-
cording to the majority rule, must be distinguished from the
provision in the principal case; for in the principal case there is
no express agreement or consent on the part of the makers that
an extension of time of payment may be made, but merely an
15 28 Col. L. Rev. 240.
52 State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321, 323 (1880).
53 26 Mich L. Rev. 568. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind. L.
Jour. 397.
54 Smith v. Zabel, 157 N. E. 551 (Ind. 1927).
55 Chaffee's 4th ed. On Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 870;
Woodbury v. Roberts, 59 Iowa 348, 13 N. W. 312; Annaheim Nat. Bank
v. Dolph (Cal. 1927), 255 Pac. 184; Glidden v. Henry, 104 Ind. 278, 1 N. E.
369. See also 21 Mich. L. Rev. 927 for analysis of these conflicting views.
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agreement that if an extension be given, the obligation of the
makers to pay would not thereby be released. 56 Hitherto no
court holding that the usual extension of provisions renders the
note non-negotiable has decided that this fact alone is sufficient
basis for drawing a distinction between this provision and the
usual extension provision. Where this provision has been be-
fore such courts they have either, as in the principal case, re-
ferred to their earlier cases where this provision was construed
to mean the same as the usual extension provision or so con-
strued it in the particular case before them. "However doubt-
ful the conclusion of non-negotiability may be when there is an
agreement to extend time, there would seem to be even more
doubt as to the soundness of the like conclusion when the pro-
vision is in the form found in the principal case."ST
STATE v. BOWMAN
The Yale Law Journal58 commentator disapproves the case of
State v. Bowman on the ground that it can not be defended on
the basis of recognized principles of statutory interpretation
and on the ground that it reaches a most undesirable result. The
Bowman case involved an Indiana statute which provided that
the compensation for legislators in Indiana should be six dollars
a day during the session. In 1925 an agreement was passed, to
take effect January 1, 1929, by which "ten" dollars was substi-
tuted for "six" dollars in the original provision. The 1927 leg-
islature passed an emergency act over the governor's veto mak-
ing the compensation for that session ten dollars a day. In an
action to compel payment, this statute wfas found unconstitu-
tional by the trial court as violating the state constitution, Ind.
Const., Art. 4, sec. 29 (forbidding an increase of compensation
to take effect during the session at which it was made.) Held,
on appeal, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be re-
versed on the ground that the Amendment of 1925 by implica-
tion repealed upon its publication the former statute, and that
since there was no provision for compensation for the 1927
legislature, the act was valid.59
56 Oyler v. MeMurray, 7 Ind. App. 645, 34 N. E. 1004; Evans v. Odem,
30 Ind. App. 207, 65 N. E. 755; Rosville State Bank v. Heslet, 84 Kans.
315, 113 Pac. 1052.
57 26 Mich. L. Rev. 569.
58 37 Yale L. Jour. 127. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind.
L. Jour. 330.
59 State v. Bounnan, 156 N. E. 394 (Ind. 1927).
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If the Emergency Act of 1927, as an independent statute, was
intended to repeal in part the 1925 statute, its repealing effect
would not operate until its own provisions went into effect.6 0
This repeal could be either express or implied. Or the amend-
ment might have expressly provided that the old statute remain
in effect. But the failure to use either method was held in the
instant case to indicate a legislative intent that the repeal take
immediate effect. Nevertheless, as suggested in the dissenting
opinion, the amendment of 1925 by fixing the time of increase
would seem clearly to manifest an intent to preserve the old
law until the time indicated for the beginning of the increase.61
The Indiana court cites the proposition that such portions of an
act as are replaced by an amendment are thereby abrogated.
But the question here involved is the time of such abrogation.
The general rule is that an amended statute is construed as if
the amendment had been enacted in the original, 62 but this rule
like many other rules, in statutory construction, is considered
to be for the purpose of interpreting the intent of legislature.68
And it has been forcefully urged that in cases of genuine am-
biguity the court should interpret the statute so as to reach a
desirable result rather than to try to determine the "supposed
legislative intent."6 4 The Yale commentator submits that it is
undesirable to permit a legislature to increase its own salary
and that the instant case might properly have prevented this
result. It is urged further that the decision is wrong as a mat-
ter of strict construction since an amendment does not repeal
an inconsistent statute until the time fixed for its taking effect.
Accordingly, if the legislature postpones the time of taking
effect of the amendment, the repeal should likewise be delayed
in the absence of express provision to the contrary.6 5
60 Leyner v. State, 8 Ind. 490 (1856) ; State v. Paul, ao Wash. 83, 151
Pac. 114 (1915); 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Lewis ed. 1904),
sec. 246.
61 McDowell v. Warden of Mich. Reformatory, 169 Mich. 332, 135 N. W.
265 (1912).
02 Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 81 N. W. 839 (1900) ; Sutherland, Statu-
tory Construction (Lewis ed. 1904), sec. 237.
63 Blake v. Board of Education, 112 Kan. 266, 210 Pac. 351 (1922).
64 Sutheland, Statotory Construction (Lewis ed. 1904), sec. 364.
Fruend, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 207, 231 (1917).
65 Spaulding v. Alford, 1 Pick. 33 (Mass. 1822).
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STATE EX REL. SCHROEDER v. MORRIS.
The Harvard Law Review 66 comments on the case of State
ex rel. Schroeder v. Morris and comes to the conclusion that this
case distinctly limits the Indiana doctrine which had been enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in the past. The commentator
takes the view that this general Indiana doctrine is in conflict
with a majority of the decisions in other states, and that the in-
stant case is much to be commended in so far as it limits the
applicability of the doctrine in Indiana and will tend to restrict
its extension in other states. The instant case involves some
citizens of New Albany who brought a mandamus proceeding
against the mayor and the city council of that city to compel
them to comply with a state statute. The statute provided that
the fire departments of all cities having a population of over
14,000 (which included New Albany) should be divided into two
platoons, one to perform day service and the other night ser-
vice. The mayor and city council demurred. Judgment was
given for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Held, that
the statute did not interfere with the right of municipalities
to local self-government.67
"The doctrine that even in the absence of express constitu-
tional limitations, there are restrictions upon the power of the
legislature to interfere in the local affairs of municipalities,
originated in a dictum of Judge Cooley But the
leading proponent of the doctrine has been the Supreme Court
of Indiana." 68  In a leading case, the doctrine was applied by
the Indiana court to invalidate a statute which appointed a
board to take charge of a local fire department.69 "The rule is
based on the assumption that there was at the time of the fram-
ing of the Constitution a uniform practice of non-interference
by the state legislature in purely local matters. The historical
inaccuracy of this assumption has been exposed."70 The de-
66 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1153.
67 State ex rel. Schroeder v. Morris, 155 N. E. 198 (Ind. 1927).
68 40 Hary. L. Rev. 1153-1154. See also People v. Hurlbert, 24 Mich.
44 (1871); State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274 (1888).
69 State v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N. E. 19 (1902).
70 40 Hary. L. Rev. 1154. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right
of Local Self Government, 16 Col. L. Rev. 190 (1916). And this doctrine
seems to have been repudiated in a majority of the states. Booth v. Mc-
Guinness, 78 N. J. L. 346, 75 Atl. 456 (1919). Contra: State v. Barker,
116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204 (1902).
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cision in the present case is merely that the regulation concerns
a state-wide interest; the language of the decision, however, in-
dicates a decided change in the attitude of the Indiana court,
showing an intention to restrict the doctrine to the facts of ad-
judicated cases.
STATE v. SCHUMAKER
In this case the superintendent of the state Anti-Saloon
League caused his annual report to be published in pamphlet
form and distributed throughout the state. The report also ap-
peared in the official publication of the League. In the course of
his report the superintendent asserted that substantial justice
had been defeated through the refusal of the state supreme court
to allow the admission of illegally obtained evidence in several
liquor cases which he named. He also called upon the electors to
return a "dry" supreme court at the next elections, stating that
at least one of the then sitting members was said to be bitterly
hostile to prohibition. The attorney general of the state filed
an information, alleging that the superintendent was guilty of
an indirect contempt of court. Held, that he is guilty of con-
tempt of court because the report in question is apt improperly
to influence the court on a principle of law that will certainly be
involved in future cases, by criticism of the reasoning of the
court and by threats to defeat its members at the polls.71
This case has received critical comment in more legal peri-
odicals than any other decision rendered by the Indiana courts
during the current year. It has been approved by two law re-
views, not for the reasons given in the decision itself, but be-
cause it is thought to be justified upon the facts according to
some authorities in England and America. Of the six-periodic-
als that have commented on the case, however, four disapprove
it both in its result and in its reasoning. The Illinois Law Re-
vieW7 2 approves the case on the ground that any criticism of a
court in so far as this relates to its official functions may be
punished as contemptuous, if it is found that that criticism is
calculated to degrade the court in the public mind and hence to
interfere with the administration of justice.73 The Illinois Law
71 State v. Shumaker, 157 N. E. 769 (Ind. 1927).
72 22 11. L. Rev. 768. This case is also commented upon in 3 Ind. L.
Jour. 149.
73ln re Dill, 32 Kan. 668, 5 Pac. 39, 49 Am. St. Rep. 505; Wyatt v.
People, 79 Colo. 252, 26 Pac. 961; Watson v. Williams, 36 Mass. 331.
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Review states that this is not only the old English rule on con-
tempt but that an analysis of the decided cases shows it to be,
at least inferentially, the majority rule at the present time in
America.74 Four of the other periodical comments state that
this is not the majority rule at present and this conclusion is
supported by two writers on the subject.75 It will be noted that
even under the view of the Illinois Law Review it is never con-
temptuous to comment on decisions of a court by way of profes-
sional criticism dealing with the validity of the decisions as a
question of law. The Illinois Law Review points out that it is
not considered proper for a court to defend itself against popu-
lar attacks either in its opinions or in public comments; hence it
is urged that it is both improper and unfair for critics of the
court to publish their criticisms when those criticisms are of
such a nature as to reflect upon the honor of individual mem-
bers or the impartiality of the court itself.76 The St. Johns Law
Review77 takes much the same position but without so full a
discussion. It is said in both comments that one of the decided
cases involved in the Shumacher case was before the court on
petition for rehearing at the time of the alleged contemptuous
criticism. On this technical ground the decision in the Shu-
maker case would be reconcilable with the majority decisions
which hold that if a case is pending before the court and the
criticism of the judge or the court is of such a nature as to in-
terfere with the administration of justice, then the writer or
publisher of the criticism may be punished for contempt.78
The Pennsylvania,79 Michigan,80 Texas8 ' and Harvard Law
Reviewss 2 take the view that the decision is in conflict with the
former position of the Indiana court on the same subject and
that it is contrary to the great weight of authority in America
74 "Where a motive of the court is impugned, the cause generally hold
that it is immaterial that the question had been disposed of at the time
of the act or words." 22 Ill. L. Rev. '769.
75 Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Hazv. L. Rev. 161,
163 (1908); Willis, Punishment for Contempt of Court, 2 Ind. L. Jour.
309 (1927).
76 Albertsworth, Contempt of Court in Commenting upon Literary Style
of Judge, 20 Ill. L. Rev. 190-2.
77 2 St. Johns L. Rev. 88.
78 Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161,
163 (1908).
79 76 Pa. L. Rev. 210.
80 26 Mich. L. Rev. 440.
81 6 Tex. L. Rev. 388.
82 41 Harv. L. Rev. 255.
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today.83 They state that its result is most unfortunate. They
seem to admit that the case might be upheld in so far as it in-
volved a criticism of a case then pending before the court on peti-
tion for rehearing, but they imply that this basis would be
highly technical and they do not discuss it inasmuch as the court
itself does not discuss it or base its decision upon it. The com-
mentators disapprove the decision, stating that "the Indiana
court's assertion that criticism of decided cases might tend to
influence timid judges in deciding like cases is as well founded in
fact as that the criticism might influence the judge in disposing
of a pending case. But the desirability of free comment and
discussion by the public on the decisions of appellate courts.
which form a large part of the law, is much greater than in the
instance of pending cases. It is generally thought that decided
cases may be discussed, and the court criticized or censured for
its decision, as any official act may be. The judge has the same
protection, by both criminal and civil process, that any citizen or
official has. At best, that a person should sit in judgment, and
sometimes act also as prosecutor and witness, in a case in which
he is the aggrieved party, is an anomalous situation. The rea-
sons given for this practice, a survival of the crime of lese
majesty, that it tends to preserve respect for the courts, and that
the criticism might influence the court favorably to the side of
the person criticising, are equally ironical. '8 4
WALLACE V. STATE
The Columbia Law Review85 commentator discusses the case
of Wallace v. State and concludes that its holding is not in keep-
ing with present authorities and that its result is not desirable.
In this case a search warrant was issued on an officer's affidavit
that he "has reason to believe and does believe" that the defend-
ant possessed intoxicating liquor and implements in violation of
the state prohibition law. The defendant was indicted, liquor
and distilling apparatus having been seized under the warrant.
The Indiana statute regulating the issuance of warrants pro-
83 "Such seems to have been the law in Indiana prior to the decision
of the principal case." 41 Harv. L. Rev. 255. Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind.
301, 11 N. E. 426 (1887); Zuber v. State, 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E. 828
(1919). See also Willis, Punishment for Cortempt of Court, 2 Ind. L.
Jour. 309, 314 (1927).
84 6 Tex. L. Rev. 388-89.
85 28 Col. L. Rev. 103. This case also is commented on in 3 Ind. L.
Jour. 151.
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vided that if any person should make an affidavit that he had
reason to believe and did believe liquor was being kept in viola-
tion of the law, a warrant should issue. On appeal from an
order of the lower court overruling the defendant's motion to
quash the search warrant and the affidavit, and to suppress the
evidence seized, held, judgment reversed.8 6
The court stated a search warrant, based solely upon an affi-
davit of information and belief, was invalid and the search
under it unlawful. The affiant must make a satisfactory show-
ing of facts constituting probable cause to the magistrate em-
ployed to issue the warrant. By virtue of the Fourth amend-
ment and similar provisions in state constitutions, warrants may
not issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation.8 7 "Under specific statutes in most states, the magis-
trate, before issuing the warrant, is expressly required to ex-
amine the grounds of the application and have the facts, on
which such charge is based, set forth in the affidavit. But under
statutes like the one in the instant case, it would seem that a
warrant may be issued based solely on an affidavit of informa-
tion and belief without the requirement that a showing of facts
be made from which the magistrate could draw an inference of
probable cause."188 The opinion in the instant case, however,
held that the statute simply did not state all the requisites with
which issuance of warrants must comply and that if it did pur-
port to do so such a statute should be declared unconstitutional.
"It is difficult to see why the statute should be declared uncon-
stitutional, because in any event, whether or not the affiants'
declaration that he 'has reason to believe and does believe' is
regarded as tantamount to a declaration that he has probable
cause to believe, the search warrant can be quashed if probable
cause did not exist at the time of issue."8' 9 In addition, the
judgments of magistrates on probable cause are notoriously un-
certain, and their judicial function of issuing warrants might
well be limited, especially because some jurisdictions hold that
a magistrate's finding of probable cause is conclusive. "The
86 Wallace v. State, 157 N. E. 657 (Ind. 1927).
87 Frankel, Concerning Searches and Seizures. 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361
(1921).
88 28 Col. L. Rev. 104. In such cases as the one set forth in the text
it may be a mere fiction to hold that a finding of probable cause can be
inferred from the fact that the magistrate issued the warrant. Frihart
v. State, 189 Wisc. 622, 208 N. W. 459 (1926) ; City of Jackson v. Howard,
135 Miss. 102, 99 So. 497 (1924).
89 28 Col. L. Rev. 104.
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instant case probably represents the most desirable rule pro-
vided it does not preclude the issuance of warrants on hearsay
evidence, when such evidence constitutes probable cause." 90
WOLF HOTEL CO. V. PARKER
The Michigan Law Review 9' comments favorably upon the
case of Wolf Hotel Company v. Parker both on the ground that
the case is in accord with the majority rule at the present time
and on the ground that it reaches a good result. In this instance
the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's hotel. The defend-
ant stored the plaintiff's trunk in the basement, where water,
backed from the sewer after an unusual rainfall, damaged cloth-
ing in the trunk. The lower, court instructed the jury that if
the defendant knew or should have known the basement flooded
after heavy rainfall and had not taken precaution to prevent
flooding of the basement by ordinary rains, and if such precau-
tions would have prevented the flooding which caused the dam-
age, the fact that there was an unusual rainfall was no defense.
Held, there was no error in these instructions.9 2
An independent intervening agency may break up the casual
connection between the defendant's breach of duty to the plain-
tiff and the injury, and relieve the defendant from liability.93
"The intervening agency, however, must so supersede the opera-
tion of the defendant's negligence that the intervening cause,
without defendant's negligence contributing thereto, produced
the damage." 94  If the intervening agency merely accelerates
the original cause, which of itself was sufficient to produce the
injury, the primal wrongful act is still the proximate cause.
The decision in the instant case is in accord with these prin-
ciples. The intervening Act of God was unusual, but the wrong-
ful act in allowing the basement to be in such condition that
ordinary rainfall would have caused the damage was sufficient
to fix liability in law.95
90 28 Col. L. Rev. 105.
91 26 Mich. L. Rev. 704.
92 Wolf Hotel Co. v. Parker, 158 N. E. 294 (Ind. 1927).
9 3 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Loack, 143 I1. 242, 32 N. E. 285, 18
L. R. A. 215; I Shearman and Redfield, Negligence, 6th ed., sec. 32 et seq.
94 26 Mich. L. Rev. 704. Baltimore, etc., Rd. Co. v. Sulphur Springs
School District, 96 Pa. St. 65; I Thompson, Negligence, 2nd. ed., sec. 73.
95 Ulrich v. Dakota Loan and Trust Co., 3 S. D. 44; Beale, Proximate
Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633; Jeremiah Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223, 303.
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